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Abstract 
This paper contrasts two views of intergenerational justice. 
The first view is a global one, which focuses on the aggregate 
well-being of each generation and discounts future generations' 
utilities. In this view discounting is not a notion of inter­
generational justice; instead it is defended as a necessary condition 
of intergenerational efficiency. And intergenerational efficiency 
is not advanced as a notion of intergenerational justice but as a 
strongly desirable condition of any intergenerational just system. 
The appeal of the discounting approach is explained by a set 
of conditions which define neoclassical utilitarianism. Within 
the defining conditions, discounting future utilities is '' natural," 
but not necessary for efficiency. The framework of intergenerational 
social choice also fits the defining conditions of neoclassical 
utilitarianism, and it is easy to construct choice rules which do not 
discount future utilities and yet which are intergenerationally 
efficient. 
Although there is room within neoclassical utilitarianism for 
efficient rules of choice which do not discount future utilities, the 
second view of intergenerational justice does not appear to fit 
naturally within the utilitarian system. The second view of 
intergenerational justice is specialized, and focuses on the 
preservation of "essential u opportunities. 
The second view becomes more appealing when the defining 
conditions of neoclassical utilitarianism are modified. In 
modifying the conditions, the notion of intergenerational efficiency 
becomes weaker, partly because as an ordering principle it becomes 
less complete and partly because potential Pareto improvements are 
no longer discretionary from the vantage point of the future. How 
much, if any, efficiency loss there might be from application of 
the specialized notion of intergenerational justice depends on the 
extent of modification of the defining conditions and the structure 
of institutions spanning generational time. The modified conditions 
appear to accord more closely with commonsense notions of 
intertemporal justice than do the original conditions. And thus 
the opportunity concept of intergenerational justice appears to 
be closer to our commonsense notions of intragenerational justice 
than does the global (discounting) concept. 
Intergenerational Justice as Opportunity* 
by 
Talbot Page 
In managing the resource base we have to deal somehow with the 
potential of very long-lived costs.1 For nuclear power a principal 
concern is with the effects of radioactive material; for oil, 
depletion; for coal, cancer, climate modification, and ultimately 
depletion. Row much emphasis we give to conservation and other 
alternatives depends on how we think about these long-term costs.. In 
this paper I attempt to distinguish between two views .. 
In the first view, long-term energy costs should be discounted 
and treated just like other future costs.. This means that present and 
future energy costs are weighted and then added together .. With a 
positive discount rate future costs are counted less heavily than 
present costs.. If as a matter of equity or justice between 
generations, it is thought that future generations are going to be made 
to suffer too much from these costs (or any other costs imposed by the 
present generation) then this view allows for compensation by a 
transfer of aggregate wealth across generations.. The usually 
recommended means to such a transfer would be to lower the discount 
rate uniformly for all investments through the tax structure.2 This 
* Forthcoming in Energy � the � ed. by Douglas MacLean and
Peter G. Brown, Totowa, N .. J., Rowman-Littlefield .. 
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appears to be consensus view among neoclassical economists. It is a 
global approach to handling long-term energy costs.3 
As a special case, it is sometimes recommended as a matter of 
intergenerational justice that the intertemporal weights be all set 
equal � by setting the discount rate equal to zero. '!his followed in 
practical decision-making, is a special case of discounting generally 
because it still treats present and future costs as commensurable � to 
be c�ined by a simple (weighted) average. It is a global approach in 
the other sense as well, as it treats energy and other costs on the 
same footing .. 
In the second view, potentially large and very long-term costs 
of energy alternatives should be treated specially, partly because they 
are large and long-term and partly because they have to do with the 
management of the resource base.. In this view, the resource base 
should be preserved "essentially intact," as a matter of justice 
between generations. 
In the first section of the paper, I contrast the second view 
with the global one. In the second section, I give conditions that 
define "neoclassical economic utilitarianism," ("neoclassical 
utilitarianism," for short) which I take to be the philosophical 
perspective of neoclassical economics.. Briefly, a neoclassical 
utilitarian does not attempt to maximize the sum of utilities over all 
people, as does his classical utilitarian forebear.. Instead, for a 
neoclassical utilitarian each p2rson maximizes his own utility 
separately. In the third section, I suggest that a global discounting 
approach fits naturally but not inevitably with the defining principle 
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of utilitarianism. (both classical and neoclassical). There appears to 
be room for the alternative view within the neoclassical system, but 
the fit is partial. And in the fourth section, I consider what happens 
when the principles def ini.ng the neoclassical system are no longer 
viewed as obtaining. By modifying the principles, we move outside 
neoclassical utilitarianism, at least as I have defined it . The second 
view of intergenerational justice seems more consistent with these 
modified principles. Thus it really belongs outside neoclassical 
utilitarianism. But as I find the modified principles more "realistic" 
than the original conditions, I find this an argument in favor of the 
second view of intergenerational justice. In the fifth section, I 
consider the principal objection to this alternative , that it is likely 
to lead to intergenerational inefficiency. Both for empirical and 
conceptual reasons it appears that the notion of efficiency applies 
somewhat differently, and with less normative appeal, when there are 
long time periods and potentially grave harms involved. 
Two preliminaries are in order. First, it should be made clear 
that one does not need to abandon a notion of discounting if one 
accepts the second view. If one accepts the second view, there is a 
role for discounting, in terms of the opportunity cost of capital for 
specifying what it means to keep the resource base "essentially 
intact." And there remains the traditional role for discounting once 
the prerequisites or constraints of intergenerational justice are met. 
While the second view does not "abandon" discounting or advocate zero 
discounting , there are fundamental differences between the two views , 
which the paper tries to clarify. Second, in attempting to elucidate 
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the two views , I have drawn what may appear an unflattering portrait of 
a neoclassical utilitarian and his theory of mind. That is not the 
intention. As sketched, the theory is simple but simple theories have 
hard cutting edges. The enormous power and utility of traditional 
economic analysis are not in question .  What is in question is the 
appropriateness of the theory and the perspective for the problem of 
very large and very long: term costs, where issues of intergenerational 
justice are fundamental. 
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I. Global Versus Special 
The most appealing argument for discounting long-term energy 
costs at the same rate as other costs is only peripherally related to a 
concept of intergenerational justice. Instead it is based on 
intergenerational Pareto optimality.4 The argument goes as follows. In 
markets, costs and benefits are discounted at a rate equal to the 
opportunity cost of capital, i.e., the value of alternative uses of 
invested capital. If energy costs are handled specially � discounted 
at a lower rate, discounted at a zero rate, or handled in some other 
way altogether � then the resulting plan and resource use will be 
intergenerationally inefficient. It will be possible to modify the 
plan so that some or all generations are made better off without 
hurting others. And the modification will be made by discounting 
energy costs "just like" other costs and benefits. Since a Pareto 
improvement is generally considered good, discounting, as the condition 
for it, must also be considered good. 
An example illustrates the point. Suppose we are to choose 
among several possible uses of $100,000 worth of resources. The 
choices are: (A) Use the $100,000 for a short-term safety program with 
the expectation of saving two lives this year; (B) Invest the $100,000 
at the prevailing market rate of interest, let us say 7 percent; (C) 
Spend $100,000 on incrementally improving the safety features of a 
nuclear plant with the expectation of saving four lives thirty years 
from now; and (D) A combination of the above. Suppose further that in 
thirty years it will still be possible to institute a short-term safety 
program for $100,000 worth of real resources with the expectation of 
6 
saving two lives in the thirtieth year. If we are to treat energy 
costs specially, particularly ones having to do with costs to life, we 
might not want to discount the four lives of (C). Treating the date of 
a life saved as ''morally irrelevant 1111 the saving of four lives thirty 
years from now appears an even better bargain than saving two lives 
now, and (C) seems better than (A). Because we are treating lives and 
energy costs specially we might not even consider (B) , and make our 
choice for (C). 
But according to the argument for discounting this would be a 
mistake, and it can be seen to be a mistake by a simple discount 
calculation. Discounting four lives thirty years from now at 7 percent 
per year, we have the equivalent of only 0.5 expected lives, at 
present. Thus (A), which saves two lives now, beats (C) and there must 
be an intergenerational inefficiency. And so we must be able to find a 
way of making all generations better off, compared with plan (C). One 
such way would be to follow (D) by devoting half of the $100,000 to the 
short-term lifesaving program, with the expectation of saving one life 
in the present generation (follow (A) with· half of the resources). The 
other half is invested in (B) where it grows to $381,000 in thirty 
years. The proceeds then are channeled into a short-term lifesaving 
program with the expectation of saving slightly more than seven lives 
in that generation. All generations are made better off, compared with 
(C): the first generation by saving an extra life, the second by saving 
an extra three lives. 
There are some problems with this argument in its trading off 
lives from one program to another and in its application to the very 
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long term, but I want to postpone a discussion of these problems until 
the end, and follow another thread of the argument for now. It is well 
known that efficient allocations may not be fair or just ones. The 
present generation might be very well off and future generations 
starving and cancer-ridden, from radioactive materials and other toxic 
chemicals. And yet the situation could still be intergenerationally 
efficient in the sense that the future could not be made better off 
without making the present worse off. Justice is not efficiency: it 
may be possible to move from one efficient but unfair allocation to 
another efficient and fairer allocation. 
At this point I will simply stipulate that intergenerational 
efficiency is a desirable property to be obtained when it can be 
achieved. Instead I want to focus on the across-the-board, aggregative 
aspect of the discounting approach. The approach is global in the 
sense that everything is subject to substitution and trade-off. 
This approach can be contrasted with the more specialized or 
piecemeal approach in a second illustration. Suppose that you are to 
occupy a friend's house for a month, while the friend is away on 
vacation. In the course of your stay you make some phone calls, eat 
some of the staples, and perhaps drink some of the beer in the 
refrigerator. As your stay draws to a close you restock the 
refrigerator, replenish the staples, mow the lawn, and generally 
arrange to put the house back into the condition in which you found it. 
This is a piecemeal approach. You are not primarily concerned with 
maximizing the sum of your and your friend's utility nor are you 
concerned with an efficient allocation between you and your friend. 
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You are interested in putting things, particular things, back where you 
found them. Of course the rice you buy is not the identical rice that 
you ate, it may not even be rice if you can't find it. But it will be 
a close physical substitute. (Row close will depend on how particular 
you are and how particular you think your friend is.) You might go 
further and leave some flowers or a house present, but that would be a 
gift, not a requirement. What is required, on this view, is to leave 
intact physically what is not yours to run down. 
It is also possible to take a more global view. Why should I 
mow the lawn, you might say. Perhaps my friend will want to reseed the 
lawn. Why should I do the laundry? Perhaps my friend will want to buy 
some new sheets. Instead I will leave a generalized transfer. I will 
leave some money, enough to compensate him if he wants to mow the lawn 
and do the laundry himself, or hire someone, or help finance some other 
choice if he wants that. In this way the range of choice is increased 
and efficiency improved. 
Putting the house back into its original conditions is like 
keeping the resource base intact intergenerationally. Taking the more 
global perspective and letting the house run down but trading off with 
generalized compensation is like the discounting approach, but somewhat 
abstracted from it because I have abstracted from time, productivity, 
and even discounting itself. Moreover, I have glossed over a couple of 
problems to be attended to later. I would like to argue that the 
specialized approach is more appropriate than the global one, as a 
matter of intergenerational justice, but I do not want to do so within 
the framework of utilitarianism underlying modern neoclassical 
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economics. Part of the reason is that in this framework> at least as I 
will define it below, there is virtually no room for a concept of 
justice. And part of the reason is that when we depart from the 
neoclassical system by modifying its defining principles, the 
specialized view of resource preservation as a notion of 
intergenerational justice appears to fit rather nicely with the 
modified principles. Thus the next step is for me to define the 
central features of the neoclassical system. 
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II. Defining Neoclassical Utilitarianism 
If you ask an economist what it means to advocate 
utilitarianism, he might well reply that it means to prescribe behavior 
that maximizes whatever it is that one values. This definition, of 
course, it too vague and inclusive. To some extent we are all self­
serving and we all practice maximizing behavior.. In a sense1 even 
inanimate objects practice maximizing (or minimizing) behavior.. Soap 
films minimize surface area; light bends to minimize travel time 
through different media; water flows in a way to minimize potential 
energy.. If some form of maximizing behavior is the defining 
characteristic of utilitarianism1 then we are all utilitarians by 
definition. 
But the important thing for utilitarianism is not that we 
maximize1 it is the pervasive nature and the particular conception of 
utilitarian maximizing behavior.. Thus it is useful to define 
utilitarianism by the principles that make the maximization process 
universal. 
Maximization is difficult when there are many distinctions 
drawn. It is generally impossible to maximize two separate things at 
the same time. The principles that I set out below serve to clear away 
or collapse distinctions that might otherwise interfere with the 
maximization process. One way of stating the matter is to say that 
these principles are conflation.s .. 5 My approach is to take conflations 
as the defining characteristics of utilitarianism.. Clearly there are 
advantages t·o abstracting from O::etail and blurring distinctions.. In 
the case of mathematical argument1 abstracting and generalizing often 
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lead to deeper and more powerful insights into structures of ideas. 
But there can be disadvantages too. When the distinctions are 
important, glossing them over can lead to a structure of ideas quite 
different from the world that we are trying to say something about. 
Principles Qi. Neoclassical Utilitarianism 
Some of the utilitarian principles can be seen as defining a 
theory of mind, and a very simple one at that. The neoclassical 
utilitarian is drawn to this theory for two important reasons. The 
first is to portray all a person's values as generally comparable, so 
that some general maximization can make sense. Second, it to base the 
theory on observable behavior. 
The first aspect of this theory of mind can be expressed as a 
view of how values are fonned. What might otherwise be considered 
heterogeneous things (for example, decision processes, descriptions of 
conceivable states of affairs, the present and the future) are treated 
as unified, homogeneous objects through conflating many distinctions. 
I will call attention to three of these conflations. 
1. Only preferences �· There seem to be several ways of 
making decisions. For some questions the process of decision might 
follow moral reasoning, for others it follows maximization calculus. 
Some decisions might be made on the basis of religious concerns, some 
on the basis of habit, some on the basis of some automatic code of 
behavior. Or we might posit two entire preference structures: one 
appropriate for norm.al decisions, the other appropriate for moral 
choices, as was done by Plott.6 If we make such distinctions there are 
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obvious problems. We have to explain when each one applies. We need, 
at least in principle, some way of defining the boundaries among the 
processes, and we have to be able to say how one process shifts into 
another. But if we conflate all decision processes into a single 
process, that of ordering preferences, such difficulties are cleared 
away. A preference conflation implies that all these processes are 
fundamentally the same process and can be modeled as though they were 
just one process, that of preference ordering.7 For the classical 
utilitarian this first conflation can be stated by saying that each 
person has just one utility function; for the neoclassical utilitarian, 
just one preference ordering. 
2. ill states are comparable. The idea of a "state" is a very 
general concept. It is a complete description of reality. This 
description can include such morally laden possibilities as "John was 
murdered." The second conflation says that any complete description of 
reality is directly comparable with any other in the sense that each 
individual is assumed able to judge whether he prefers the first to the 
second, the second to the first, or is indifferent between the two. 
The classical utilitarian states the second conflation by saying that 
the domain of the utility function is all conceivable states. The 
neoclassical utilitarian would say that preference orderings is 
complete over all conceivable states for the world. 
3. �and present states are directly comparable. Now we 
turn to a matter that was left open by the second principle. This is 
the question of whether a complete description of the world � a state 
� includes a description of the future as well as the present. The 
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third con.f lation says that a state is a description not only of a 
conceivable present but also of a conceivable entire future. We can 
think of a state not just as a snapshot of the present moment, but as a 
whole movie film of an entire possible present and future, where the 
first frame is a complete description of the present and each 
successive frame is a complete description of a possible future day, or 
generation. Thus the utilitarian chooses among whole possible movie 
films, not just single frames of the movie, snapshots of the present 
moment.8 
A logical implication of this conflation is that if we are 
really choosing among whole movie films there is really just one 
choice, now, for all time. Many economic models are of this form. 
Dynamic programming models, or control theory models, collapse the 
future and the present together into a single shot choice. This point 
is clear when we realize that for control theory problems there is a 
single4'alued functional, ranging over all time, being maximized just 
once, from the vantage point of the present moment. Thus a value is 
being put upon the entire movie film and not just a single frame. 
The collapse of time is held across the life of the individual 
as well as across generations. It is as though one could put a 
thermometer into a person"' s mouth and out would pop rankings of entire 
life plans. These plans would of course be done from the vantage point 
of the present moment. In many models, the only problem is to find the 
top element of the ranking - the problem is one of maximization. It 
seems apparent, however, that 10 or 15 years from now a person will 
have interests differing from those of today (perhaps because he has 
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grown and changed or perhaps merely because of the shift in vantage 
point in time). If we accept the third conflation in full force, we 
concern ourselves only with what the thermometer says today.
9 
Backing 
off from this·full collapse of time, we might be concerned with the 
different readings of the thermometer in different vantage points in 
time. Then we would have the problem of "justly" taking into account 
potentially conflicting interests. In the language of social choice, 
there is an "aggregation" problem (the problem of resolving conflicting 
interests), in addition to the maximization problem (the problem of 
picking off the top element once the aggregation problem is resolved). 
The framework of intertemporal social choice, which later will be used 
to discuss the problem of justice across generations, can also be 
applied to the problem of justice between the earlier and later selves 
of a particular individual. 
The third conflation says that we concern ourselves only with 
what the thermometer says today. (Today's reading takes in,to account 
the contemplation of future utilities and preferences, but only insofar 
as the contemplation adds to present utility.) For a classical 
utilitarian, time-dated states are legitimate arguments for each 
individual's utility function. For the neoclassical utilitarian, 
preference orderings are complete over time-dated states. 
The second feature of what I am calling the neoclassical 
utilitarian theory of mind, the inclination to behaviorism, is 
expressed in our fourth utilitarian principle. 
4. Utilities of different individuals �not directly 
comparable. This principle can be stated as a conflation that divides 
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classical and neoclassical utilitarianism. The classical utilitarian 
accepts comparability, but the neoclassical utilitarian does not 
(except sometimes in the intertemporal case). For the classical 
utilitarian, utility is a measurable quantity, at least in principle, 
and a quantity of utility for one individual can be added to a quantity 
of utility from another individual. For a neoclassical utilitarian, 
utility is not a 11real 11 quantity - it cannot be measured even in 
principle - and thus there is no way to add one person's utility to 
another's. 
Interestingly� however, in the intergenerational case, 
neoclassical utilitarians often cross the line and act like classical 
utilitarians. While in economic analysis there is great reluctance to 
add the utility of one person to that of another, within a generation, 
utilities of different people are commonly added across time. One 
story that formally avoids adding utilities across time is to assume 
that each person lives forever. Another story that perm.its adding 
utilities across generations is to assume that our heirs are "just 
like" ourselves. They are extensions of ourselves, share the same 
interests, and one utility function fits all (per extended family), 
Neither story is very satisfying. 
A colorful way of stating how the neoclassical utilitarian came 
to reject the fifth conflation is to say that it was killed by the 
possibility of a utility monster. The utility monster is a sensitive 
fellow who can squeeze more utility out of a given resource than an 
ordinary person can. If we are classical utilitarians who attempt to 
maximize the sum of utilities across people, then we should give a 
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larger share of a re&ource to someone who has greater capacity to 
squeeze more utility out of it. But many economists are unwilling to 
give the larger shares of the economic pie to those most efficient in 
converting utility. One might argue to the contrary, that the less 
efficient ·converters should be given larger shares in compensation. 
Added to this is the incentives problem, which is of great 
concern to modern economists. Even if utility "existed" it would be 
non-observable, and if we were to maximize the sum of utilities there 
would be obvious incentives for each one of use to claim that he is a 
utility monster (the youngest child of each family is sometimes tempted 
toward such claims.) 
To state the matter a little more soberly, many economists 
rejected classical utilitarianism in favor of its neoclassical version 
when they decided that utility was entirely non-observable. At the 
same time it became clear that most of the structure in economics could 
be preserved by thinking in terms of preference orderings as opposed to 
quantitative utilities. Preference orderings have the advantage'of 
being, at least in principle, observable by choices actually made. 
This rejection of classical, quantitative utility has two repercussions 
noteworthy for our purposes. 
First, if interpersonal comparisons of utility are impossible, 
then we are no longer able to maximize the sum of utilities across 
people. So the neoclassical utilitarian defends a weaker kind of 
maximization process in which each one maximizes his own utility. 'Ihe 
classical utilitarian's moral principle, which says to maximize the sum 
of utilities, is strong in the sense that it sometimes directs people 
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to act against their own selfish interests. The corresponding weaker 
neoclassical utilitarian's moral principle says that we should move 
toward Pareto optimality. This principle is weaker in the sense that 
it does not require individuals to act against their own selfish 
interests. It is also weaker because in many situations it does not 
tell us what to do (it is a partial ordering). 
Second, the rejection of unobservable utilities leads toward a 
behaviorist or black-box theory of the mind. The only evidence allowed 
for interferences about happiness or satisfaction is taken to be 
observable behavior: for example, actual purchases in markets. Thus, 
evidence from introspection is looked upon with suspicion, as are 
surveys of stated preferences. The situation is a little like trying 
to infer the structure of a car's motor by observing the car's 
behavior.. With this black-box approach it is not surprising that we 
might be limited to simple concepts of the motor. 
The theory of mind for a neoclassical utilitarian may be a very 
primitive theory, but the overall view is consistent and coherent so 
there is little chance of refuting it internally.. In that sense it is 
a comprehensive theory and can explain almost anything.9a It is 
similar in this respect to other comprehensive theories of mind and 
human behavior. For example, another alternative explains every human 
action by "God willed it. 11 The theories are different but each 
difficult to refute. The mere fact that things are explainable within 
a system is not an argument for that system. Another way of choosing 
among systems involves the appeal to some outside criteria, for 
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example, Occam's razor, predictive success, introspection> or ethical 
considerations. 
The view of the mind that is presupposed by an economic theory 
will of course be very .important in assessing the moral implications of 
using that theory for making choices. There is, in addition, one 
further explicitly moral principle that is central to neoclassical 
utilitarianism. It is a thesis about rights. 
5. Property rights � M. �-specified.. This principle 
tends also to be a conflation because, in its extreme version, it can 
be taken to mean that the only important rights for the neoclassical 
utilitarian are property rights, and that anything that can be valued 
should be privately owned.l
o 
The motivation here is that free transactions through the 
market are the best way of revealing preference orderings and also of 
arriving at allocations of goods and services � states of affairs 
that are Pareto optimal. A primary way to low transaction costs and 
few conflicts among various individual rights is to completely specify 
ownership rights and make them tradable. 
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III. Discounting Within the Utilitarian System (Classical and 
Neoclassical) 
The purpose of this section is to suggest that discounting fits 
easily but not inevitably with principles 1-5 or a subset of 1-5: 
Indeed, one is struck by the number and variety of the arguments that 
take these principles as background and lead to discounting. The 
impression is that all roads lead to Rome. I will mention four of 
these arguments. 
All four approaches incorporate principles 1-3. Two of the 
roads are in the classical utilitarian tradition and incorporate 
principle 4; two are in the neoclassical tradition and reject 4. 
We will find that all four approaches are "institution free." 
This means that they define criteria, but not constitutions for 
achieving the criteria. Conflation 5 concerns property rights, an 
institutional structure. Thus the four approaches below are compatible 
with but do not directly incorporate the notion that all rights should 
be construed as property rights. 
For purposes of the paper as a whole, it is lllOre important to 
show that discounting does not inevitably fit than to show it fits 
easily into the landscape of principles 1-5. To show that some roads 
do not lead to Rome, all I need is a counterexample. The 
counterexample provided below shows that the choice of 
intergenerational decision rules, even within the confines of 
principles 1-5, is much broader than that of choosing between 
di�counting at a positive rate or discounting at a zero rate (adding up 
utilities or some other measure acrOss time). 
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Nevertheless, 1-5 do shape perspective and they do not appear 
to be a compatible background for a specialized conception of justice 
as opportunity. In the following section, I attempt to modify 1-5 to 
develop a background more conformable to this latter notion. 
Four � � Lead !.!?,. Rome 
With this itinerary in mind I begin now with four of the 
arguments leading to discounting. They all. involve a "planner" who 
trades off present and future generations' utilities somewhat as he 
would trade off his own present and future utilities in the third 
conflation. But here the planner is assumed to be, in some sense, 
intertemporally neutral, or sympathetic with the interests of all 
generations.11 
A. The planner wbo maximizes .lli. EE. of present .!BS!, �
utilities. This is a planner who is not selfish because he weights 
other generations' utilities as heavily as his own generation's. To do 
this the planner must accept the 4th conflation (he is a classical 
utilitarian). But the planner sees no sense in allocating equal weight 
to a distant generation if it may not exist. So the planner discounts 
each generation's utility by the probability that it will not exist. 
To arrive at a constant discount rate (Rome) it need only be further 
assumed that the probability of extinction during the course of one 
year, given that extinction has not already taken place, equals the 
probability of extinction during the course of another year, given that 
extinction has not already taken place before that other year.12 
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From the point of view of this discussion, the most fundamental 
normative problem is that this approach treats the probability of 
extinction as a fixed parameter outside the system, unaffected by this 
generation's actions. But the probability of the next generation's 
survival is strongly affected by the present generation's actions, and 
a sufficient guarantee of an "adequate" level of survival is �
central question of intergenerational justice. 
B. � selfish planner whose self-serving tendencies are 
blocked ll .!. x.fil .Qi. ignorance. This time we need not subscribe to 
principle 4. The planner is only looking out for bis own welfare and 
is not comparing it with others (he is a classical utilitarian). But 
even though the planner only wants to maximize the utility of his own 
generation> he does not know to which generation he belongs. Thus he 
maximizes the expected value of his own utility> weighting each 
generation's utility by the probability that he attaches to being in 
that generation. (For simplicity we imagine that each generation 
contains only one person� which may or may not be the planner.) The 
planner's utility function takes into account his own (selfish) risk 
aversion to being: caught short in a particularly barren generation. As 
in the previous argument> the planner posits the increasing likelihood 
of eventual extinction and we end up again with utility discounting, 
but a different route and a different interpretation of the utility 
function. For this Rawlsian gambler, or more accurately Rarsanyian 
gambler as interpreted by Dasgupta and Real> the key assumption leading 
to discounting is again the declining certainty of future existence. 
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C. The egalitarian planner � is worried about productivity. 
In simple models which allow for capital productivity, if we are adding 
up utilities across time (in the classical tradition) to achieve equal 
utilities across time, then we need to discount by the marginal 
productivity of capital. In this type of model, if we simply maximized 
the sum of utilities, discounting at a zero rate, early generations 
would sacrifice to invest more so that later generations could feast 
off time-delayed yields of capital. To achieve an egalitarian sharing 
across time> the productivity of capital needs to be offset by 
discounting future utilities. In more complicated models 
egalitarianism is not achieved so simply> but the flavor of 
egalitarianism remains in allowing discounting to off set 
productivity.13 
D. �planner who is fair because his preferences are 
generated l?:!. fair axioms. This is a more complicated path that is 
based on some important work that attempts to find a social choice rule 
for aggregating individual utility orderings. If we allow> as a 
simplifying assumption> that each generation's utility can be treated 
as a separate preference ordering and thus combined by an aggregative 
social choice rule, then the fairness of this rule would seem to be 
deducible from the fairness of each of the axioms that describe it. 
This is consistent with a neoclassical utilitarian perspective. 
In a pioneering set of papers, Tjalling Koopmans proves a 
theorem which can be reinterpreted in an intergenerational context.13a 
The theorem depends on a set of axi'):'l&> each of which appears neutral> 
innocuous> and fair. In its reinterpretation the theorem proves that 
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an intergenerational planner who adopted these axioms must be led to a 
social choice rule that discounts the utilities of future generations. 
The proof is mathematically complicated, and we will not try to 
reproduce it here.14 
It is possible, however, to choose a set of axioms also 
appearing neutral, innocuous, and fair, that lead to a different social 
choice rule. Kenneth Arrow's well-known axioms, applied to the 
intergenerational context, generate a social choice rule that strongly 
favors the future over the present. Arrow's collection of axioms is in 
some ways similar to majority rule voting, and the infinite majority of 
future generations dominates the minority of the present. Yet 
Koopmans's axioms, which are also applied to an infinity of 
generations, yield a quite different time bias. Most interestingly, if 
we take the crucial axiom from Koopmans' set, the axiom of 
stationarity, and combine it with Arrow"'s three axioms, we get a still 
different result: "dictatorship of the present."15 This term has a 
technical meaning in social choice theory. It means that whatever the 
first generation prefers is the intergenerational social choice. 
Thus, an axiom that seems plausible can be combined with other 
plausible axioms to yield controversial results about discounting, and 
even to yield different results under different combinations. Time 
bias is not apparent from looking at axioms singlya but depends on 
sensitive interaction among the axioms taken together. 
A further observation is that the Koopmans axioms and the Arrow 
axioms illustrate the weakness of efficiency (Pareto optimality) as an 
ethical principle. Koopmans"'s axioms lead to discounting for a social 
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choice rule; Arrow's do not. But both satisfy Pareto optimality. It 
is an axiom in both systems. Thus, the Pareto principle cannot be used 
to choose between them. 
Finally, this social choice rule framework illustrates that 
there are three possible levels at which discounting can take place. 
Each generation, individually, may discount to reflect its own time 
preferencea because each generation determines its own preference 
ordering over the entire time path. This is not true for both 
Koopmans's and Arrow"'s axioms. Second, discounting can also show up, 
in both systems, in the definition of the feasible states, by taking 
account of capital productivity in determining what is feasible. Thus, 
the opportunity costs of capital can be embedded in the definition of 
feasibility. The difference between the Koopmans and Arrow axioms 
appears at the third level. For the Koopmans axioms discounting is 
also the form of the aggregation rule. For Arrow's axioms it is not. 
We conclude, then, that within the framework of neoclassical 
utilitarianism, many paths lead to a discounting formulation. They 
exhibit a rich variety of assumption and interpretation. But there are 
also paths that do not lead to discounting, � the level of 
intergenerational choice. This third level is the level of our main 
concern. Arrow's axioms, reinterpreted intergenerationally, show that 
it is possible to not have Pareto optimality without discounting at the 
level of social choice, yet with discounting for personal time 
preference and the opportunity cost of capital at the other two levels. 
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IV. Outside the Neoclassical System 
In the preceding; section we looked inside the neoclassical 
system. We found room for aggregation of intergenerational interests 
without discounting them. However, in the neoclassical system any 
notion of justice would have to be built on the utilitarian principles 
1-3. Within this theory "preferences are all." They soak up and 
explain all forms of choice and behavior at the individual level. It . 
may be possible to develop within this system a satisfactory notion of 
a fair or just aggregation of intergenerational preferences. Indeed, 
we have shown there are alternative conceptions of intergenerational 
fairness inside the neoclassical system. But the utilitarian 
principles 1-3 are confining, as are 4-5. In this section we enlarge 
the inquiry. 
I want to develop a conception of justice that is based on 
opportunity rather than utility. To do this, I must move outside the 
neoclassical system by modifying its defining; principles. Why 
opportunity rather than utility, why move outside the neoclassical 
system? The motivation is as follows. Inside the neoclassical system 
there appears to be little room for a concept of justice at the 
individual level. Outside the system there is no unified concept of 
utility (or preferences). A simple solution is to move outside the 
system and base a notion of justice on something other than utility (or 
preferences). Brian Barry suggests in his chapter that opportunity is 
a more sensible base than utility (and I have put forward a similar 
suggestion). 16 
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There is another reason for moving outside the neoclassical 
system: it may be ''unrealistic>" too simple to describe adequately how 
our values determine which choices are made and which actions 
undertaken, and too simple to incorporate our considered judg ments 
about rights and property. If the world is "really" more complicated> 
then to capture the most important complications it becomes necessary 
to draw some distinctions. 
So now we move outside the utilitarian system (both classical 
and neoclassical) and attempt to draw some distinctions that might be 
considered realistic and important. these distinctions lead toward a 
commonsense notion of justice generally> intragenerationally as well as 
intergenerationally. But in the intergenerational context they appear 
to pick out the resource base as a special concern of justice. The 
conception of intergenerational justice constructed below is not 
"inevitable." Other conceptions are possible. But the idea is to base 
this intergenerational concept of justice on its relationship to a 
commonsense notion of justice intragenerationally. 
The way to proceed is as follows. I make some "relevant" 
distinctions in the neoclassical principles 1 through 5� as they lead 
toward a commonsense concept of justice intragenerationally. Then I 
apply these distinctions to the intergenerational case. The appeal for 
this concept of justice is then grounded in the independent 
reasonableness of the distinctions. 
A. All ownership rights .!.tt �.rot.!. par. 
I adopt here the Lockean notion of "just acquisition." The most 
absolute claim of just acquisition by an individual is the claim to 
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one's work when it is wholly created by oneself. Thus, Byron had a 
right to burn his books, but his wife did not, without his permission. 
(The classical utilitarian would not see the point of this distinction 
and might indeed deny Byron himself the right to burn his books.) The 
next strongest claim of just acquisition is by an individual who 
"produces" an object by mixing his labor with a resource of which there 
is "enough and as good" left for others. The least claim, in fact no 
claim at all, of just acquisition concerns the resource base as a whole 
from the point of view of the present generation. For the resource 
base passes into the hands of the present generation by the mere 
passage of time alone, willy-nilly, without any effort by the present 
generation. Shakespeare's plays are a part of this resource base. 
They were not produced by the present generation, hence this generation 
does not have the right of ownership over them in a sense that would 
justify doing what it wants to them, including destroying all records 
of them. 
By this distinction, ownership is a relative not an absolute 
concept and is based on a relative notion of just acquisition. This 
notion of acquisition sharply distinguishes the resource base, 
including the cultural and technological heritage of past generations, 
from the capital stock produced by this generation. The distinction 
between present capital and the resource base is not admitted in the 
neoclassical utilitarian system. In fact, within the neoclassical 
utilitarian system, it is likely to be argued that such a distinction 
will lead to large intertemporal inefficiencies. I will discuss this 
in section V. 
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The distinction between just ad unjust acquisition is 
constantly made in everyday life. Even if you innocently buy stolen 
goods, your ownership is not secure because the goods were not justly 
acquired by the thief and thus not the thief's to sell or yours to own. 
In the United States we allow rather absolute ownership rights over 
particular natural resources. One interpretation of this approach is 
that it has historically been believed in this country that resources 
are sufficiently extensive that there are "enough and as good" 
remaining for others, including later generations. In other countries, 
where resources have been more obviously limited, ownership of natural 
resources is more circumscribed. With the growing concern that the 
Lockean proviso is not satisfied, there is greater concern about how 
absolute the ownership of natural resources � k· For example, 
the trend toward increasing severance taxes can be viewed as a 
limitation on the absolute ownership of materials extracted from the 
environment. 
The distinction � between what is acquired more through our 
own efforts and what less � leads to a commonsense notion of 
intergellerational justice. By this notion, it would be unjust to 
future generations if we were to run down the resource base when we 
have the opportunity to treat it on a sustainable basis: since the 
resource base was not justly acquired by us, it would be unjust to run 
it down. By the same token, �t would be unjust to run down the 
previous generation's capital and cultural accumulation. It might be 
ungenerous if the present generation chose to add nothing to the future 
heritage, but it would not be considered unjust (like the house 
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sitter's non-obligation to provide flowers). Thus this commonsense 
notion of justice is a kind of minimum of moral responsibility. 
Clearly, the idea of preserving what is not justly acquired 
needs to be made more practical. '!he present generation cannot be 
recl,11ired to preserve every obscure, :mi.nor literary work that all 
previous generations might have produced. Nor can it be required to 
preserve every tree, or oil and coal deposit. In the example of the 
house guest in the first section, the replacement of the basic stocks 
was not precise. Little things need not be restored to their original 
position, only the more essential. Thus, to make this notion of 
justice practical, we need some notion about what is more and what is 
less essential. 
:S. !!QS. ill states Q!: goods �comparable. 
The second distinction is to say that some things are more 
essential than others. Obvious candidates for essentiality are basic 
health and liberty. Essential goods appear to correspond with Rawls's 
primary good. the idea of essentiality also appears in Adam Smith's 
diamond and water paradox. Smith thought it a paradox that though 
water was much more valuable (essential) than diamonds, diamonds had a 
much higher price per unit than water. A way of distinguishing the 
essential from the non-essential is to note that we might consider 
trading essential goods near the margin, but not far inside the margin. 
For example, suppose that you are wrongly convicted and imprisoned. 
After a day in jail, the authorities realize their mistake and set you 
free. Unlike the current system, the authorities attempt to make 
complete restitution for you. They ask you how much money you would 
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need to have in order to make you feel completely indifferent between 
the day's imprisonment and the compensation and neither the 
imprisonment nor the compensation. Even though you are trading off 
liberty in this case, you might be able to name a figure that would 
indeed make you indifferent between having the mistake and the 
compensation and neither. (Whether or not you would honestly reveal 
this figure is a separate question.) 
However, suppose that you are falsely convicted and imprisoned 
for twenty years before the authorities realize their mistake. At that 
time, the authorities again pose the same question to you. What 
compensation would you require to make you feel indifferent between the 
twenty-year mistake and the compensation and neither the mistake nor 
the compensation? In this case, even if you attempt to address this 
question honestly, you might have no way of dealing with it. You may 
find you have no basis for the comparison, no way of naming such a 
figure, even a very high figure. Similarly, one can ask you what is 
the premium wage payment you are willing to accept in order to live 
with a slightly higher risk of cancer. You might be quite willing to 
make this trade-off on the margin. But suppose you, in fact, got 
cancer. Is there then some compensation that could make you feel 
indifferent to it? Or suppose you are asked to work in a hazardous 
occupation with an 80 percent probability of cancer. 
Turning to the intergenerational case, it is plausible to argue 
that the resource base as a whole is more essential than this 
generation's capital stock accumulation. For example, Japan and 
Germany got along with more than one generation's worth of capital 
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stock destroyed and both countries were able to rebuild their capital 
stock rather quickly. But it is clear that neither country could have • 
survived without their own or imported energy and metals and other 
materials from the resource base. A particular metal may not be 
essential but metals as a group are. Similarly, a single source of 
energy may be inessential but the entire energy sector is essential. A 
sufficient condition for sustain.ability, and one that is perhaps 
unnecessarily strong, is to keep the cost of extraction from the 
resource base roughly constant, major sector by major sector. This 
criterion allows substitution within sectors. It allows destruction of 
some resources. Elsewhere I have discussed the role of severance taxes 
in creating new technologies and new substitutes for the depleting, 
resources and thus promoting sustai.uability.17 
C. Offsetting harms with benefits. 
Attitudes toward the distinction between doing good and 
avoiding harm is a litmus test for utilitarians. Within the 
utilitarian system we can't distinguish between avoiding harm and doing 
good; one is the opportunity cost of the other. MacLean offers the 
example of randomly killing a person in order to extract two kidneys in 
order to save two lives of kidney sufferers. Within utilitarian 
systems this might seem like a net gain. But most commonsense notions 
of justice would consider it unjust to kill the one person in order to 
save the two. 
In the intergenerational context, we are currently harming 
future generations by damaging the resource base through the dispersion 
of radioactive wastes and toxic chemicals and physical depletion. At 
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the same time> we are benefiting the future by increases in the capital 
stock, technological understanding, and cultural accumulation. 
However, under this distinction, there is not a simple one-to-one 
trade-off. 
This distinction leads to a� asymmetrical treatment of the 
resource base. Bow do we draw a distinction between allowable harms 
and unallowable harms? We can't prevent all harms to the environment. 
But we can "protect" and "renew" essential,goods. We can reduce our 
releases of radiation toward the background levels of release that 
would occur through natural erosion; we can stabilize the population to 
maintain the resource base on a constant per capita basis. 
The ethical choice for the present generation is to move in one 
of two directions: The present can manage the resource base on a 
sustain.able basis or it can let the base slide into an irreversible 
decline. (If there were no way of preventing the latter option, the 
choice would lose its moral relevance.) Within the utilitarian system 
the latter choice is viewed simply as a preference of the present 
generation. Its consequences would be unfortunate for the future. In 
the alternative view the latter choice is unjust as well as 
unfortunate. 
D. Opportunity vs. utility. 
It seems sensible to focus on and limit our responsibility to 
what we can foresee and control. As future opportunity is more in our 
control than future utility, it would seem that the former is a more 
sensible predictor for a notion of intergenerational justice. With 
some effort we can control the form of the heritage to be passed on to 
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the next generation. It is beyond the control of the present 
generation to ensure that the next one will be happy or hard-working. 
It is beyond our control to increase their welfare; we can only assure 
them of certain opportunities for happiness that we can foresee will be 
essential. But we can preserve certain essentials, such as the 
valuable parts of the cultural and natural resource base. If we cannot 
ensure that these will in fact be passed on to the more distantly 
future generations, we can at least keep from ensuring that they well 
17a not be passed on. 
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V. The Inefficiency � 
From the perspective of neoclassical economics the most obvious 
objection to a special treatment of the resource base is that 
attempting to preserve it "essentially" intact could conceivably lead 
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to very large inefficiencies. A great deal of effort and sacrifice 
could be spent preserving some part of the resource base which no one 
in the future would want . '!he objection suggests both empirical and 
conceptual considerations . First the empirical. 
'!here is of course the possibility that the present will go to 
great effort to preserve something that the future does not want. But 
is this probable for the likely candid.ates for essential goods � 
conditions of basic health, alternative provision of energy sources, 
water, soil, space per capita, etc.? In the case of radioactive waste, 
the notion of intergenerational justice developed here suggests that 
aggregate exposure be kept near natural background levels. Natural 
releases are to be diminished to compensate for releases from energy 
production. Whether or not this standard can be met, and if so at what 
cost, is an empirical matter. But it is unlikely in the foreseeable 
future that people will come to be indifferent about cancer. Even if a 
cancer cure is found, many millions of people with little or no medical 
care will not benefit from it. 
As an empirical matter, it appears that with the present 
accumulation of man-ma.de capital, dependence on the physical resource 
base is growing, not shrinking. It is conceivable that we might 
someday free ourselves from our dependence on (say) metals .  In that 
case metals would become "inessential" and their preservation, in an 
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opportunity sense . would no longer be considered a matter of 
intergenerational justice. But year by year annual rates of extraction 
for aggregate resource groups go up, not down. 
Also as an empirical matter, we can ask how much it would cost 
to satisfy a notion of justice as equal opportunity. Consider a switch 
from present depletion allowances to severance taxes .  Com.pared with 
the present tax sys;em such a switch appears to impose few or no 
aggregate costs upon the present and yet to produce net benefits to the 
future .18 In other words, implementation of this notion of justice may 
even coincide with a step toward intergenerational efficiency. 
And finally, as a quite different and more conventional 
approach toward intergenerational efficiency, we may cons.ider the kind 
of compensating investments contemplated in section I.  Suppose> for 
example> we calculate that there is a 1 percent chance of large-scale 
radioactive contamination following uncontrolled nuclear proliferation 
leading to a 10 percent excess risk of cancer worldwide , 100 years from 
now. Suppose further that this risk could be eliminated by a present 
investment in safe-guards of $5 billion. Are we to decide against the 
safeguard if the expected number of deaths > discounted at the marginal 
rate of productivity ( say 10 percent) is less than the $5 billion? In 
this case the rationale for the comparison falls apart because the 
compensating investment is not sustainable for a century or more at a 
10 percent marginal rate> when the entire economy is growing at 
substantially less than that . For such a long period a substantial 
marginal investment is not a real option> because it would dwarf the 
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economy> in a 100 year interval (as it would for this example if 
economy as a whole were growing 3 percent per year) . 
These empirical inquiries> by no means settled but at least 
partially identified> are useful> but less fundamental than conceptual 
considerations. Suppose for example> contrary to empirical likelihood> 
it were possible to make large compensating investments over a century 
or more . Obviously> if the compensating investment is not made in the 
present > the compensation is not an option in the later period> because 
the investment has to grow in the intervening years to become available 
in the later years. 
The impossibility of later compensation through redistribution 
stands in stark contrast to the conventional notion of potential Pareto 
improvement . In the standard example> a dam is constructed that floods 
the land of some farmers .  But s o  much benefit is created from the dam 
as a whole that there are enough proceeds for the winners to compensate 
the losers so that everyone comes out ahead. In the conventional case 
actual Pareto improvement is possible in the second period . Thus> the 
compensation choice does not have to be taken in the first period . But 
in the intergenerational case either the compensating investment has to 
be made in the first period or it becomes irrelevant from the point of 
view of the second period because it is not an option by that time . 
The standard argument for discounting says that it is all right 
to hat:m the future> as long as it might be possible to benefit the 
future on net balance by a compensating investment > even though the 
investment is not taken. To abstract from time > this is like saying 
that it is all right for me to harm you if I had the option> which I 
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did not take, of aiding you on balance. If the haxms are minor, and 
there are many interactions , and on balance I am aiding you, then we 
might overlook the non sequitur. But when grave harms are involved the 
argument has less appeal. 
Moreover, when grave harms are involved, we may not be willing 
to trade off, period. If we reject the first and second conflations , 
and conclude that not all things are comparable, the demands of 
efficiency become weaker. For some cases there may be no way of 
deciding when someone or some generation is better or worse off. 
Perhaps nothing can be said "on balance," only that in some ways a 
person or generation is better off, in some ways worse off. 
And finally, neoclassical utilitarianism is unable to 
distinguish or choose between two very different intergenerational 
rules of choice (e.g., the implications of Arrow and Koopmans axioms) 
because both satisfy the condition of intergenerational efficiency in 
principle. Thus, intergenerational efficiency is hardly an adequate or 
sufficient notion for the long run. 
In the intergenerational case, we should start with a notion of 
a just protection of fundamental opportunities and from this initial 
starting point encourage steps toward intergenerational efficiency. 
This would mean establishing institutions that in some sense permit one 
generation to "communicaten with another. Common law, perhaps, is one 
such institution. 
It is not possible to establish trades among generations in the 
same way that trades take place intragenerationally, but it is possible 
to establish institutions whereby one generation anticipates the needs 
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of another. To the extent that we are successful in establishing such 
institutions the cost of providing justice as equivalent opportunity 




Neoclassical utilitarians make no distinctions between natural 
resources and man-made capital . These are highly substitutable. The 
focus is on highly aggregative concepts complete preference orderings 
for the neoclassical utilitarian; utility for his classical forbear. 
In this essay we move outside the utilitarian tradition to make 
several distinctions which app�ar to lead toward a commonsense notion 
of intergenerational justice. These distinctions support a specialized 
notion of justice focused on ;he preservation of opportunities arising 
from the resource base and the past accumulated cultural heritage . Not 
all opportunities demand preservation, only the most essential 
opportunities. 
I am suggesting: that if the present generation provides a 
resource base "essentially" the same as it inherited ( including the 
same lack of contamination) , it has satisfied a notion of 
intergenerational justice. •Essential," of course, is the key word , 
and I am construing it perhaps more narrowly than some would. This 
notion of intergenerational justice appears to be a sufficient one in 
the sense that if the present generation gives the next an equal chance 
at what is jointly shared across time, the requirements of 
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See, for example, Joseph Stiglitz: "The appropriate instruments 
to use for obtaining a more equitable distribution of welfare ( if
one believes that the present distribution is not equitable) are 
general instruments ,  for example monetary instruments directed at 
changing the market rate of interest." "A Neoclassical Analysis 
of the Economics of Natural Resources," in Scarcity and Growth 
Reconsidered, edited by V.K. Smith (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 19790, p .  61. 
Bow "the discount rate" and hence all interest rates are to be 
manipulated is usually left unclear. Presumably adjus�ents are 
to be done through the tax structure ,  or perhaps through monetary 
policy. There does seem to be a "targets and instruments" 
problem, because manipulation of interest rates is suggested for 
several purposes (inflation control ,  stimulation of certain 
sectors of the economy, balance of trade , etc.) 
4. Some definitions. An intergenerational Pareto improvement is a 
move in which at least one generation is made better off without 
making any other generation worse off. A Pareto optimal plan is 
5. 
6 .  
7 .  
B .  
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one where no Pareto improvements are possible. 
"Intergenerationally efficient" is used synonymously with 
"intergenerationally Pareto optimal ," and "inefficient" 
synonymously with "not Pareto optimal." 
John Rawls uses this term in passing in A. Theory of Justice 
(Cambridge, Mass. :  Barvard University Press, 1971), p. 27 . 
Charles Plott, "Ethics , Social Choice theory and the !heory of 
Economic Policy," Journal 2f_ H!SA· Sociology 2 (1972): 181-208. 
Stephen Marglin discusses the possibility of having two different 
types of valuation processes, one appropriate for market 
decisions and the other appropriate for the political arena. 
While he says he has strong sympathy for the distinction, which 
he calls the schizophrenic answer, he does not appeal to this 
approach in his paper . Instead he develops his argument on the 
basis of a single preference ordering both public and private, 
i.ntertemporal and i.ntratemporal. Stephen Ms.rglin, "The Social 
Rate of Discount and the Optimal Rate of Investment, "  Quarterly 
Journal .2.f Economics 77 (1963 ) :  95-111. 
We might imagine that the first frame , which describes the 
present , would be in much sharper detail than the other frames, 
which describe the future. But in most models the whole film is 
in equal color and detail. The film does not represent what we 
know or forecast about the present and future, in which case 
later frames would rapidly blur. The film represents a 
conceivable Present and future ,  and each possible conception of 
the future can be in as much detail as a possible conception of 
9 .  
9a. 
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the present . 
Economic models become more difficult when we admit that in the 
future we can have different interests from our current ones, and 
that these differences in interests depend upon the shifting 
vantage poiD.t in time . In such models time nreally" evolves. In 
a pioneering paper Strotz analyzes one of these problems , which 
is known as the problem of intertemporal consistency. Strotz 
notes that this problem of inconsistency disappears if 
individuals have utility functions of a discounting form. Strotz 
believes that not everyone would have such a utility function and 
there could be an "intertemporal tussle." But Strotz""s 
resolution of the intertemporal tussle is really one of 
imposition by power as opposed to a solution by "justice ." The 
idea is that if a person's utility function is of a discounting 
form, he will constrain future opportunities in such a way that 
later there will be no way to depart from today's plan, to the 
advantage of the future self. Robert Stroz, ''Myopia ad 
Inconsistency in Dynalllic Utility Maximization," Review .Q.L 
Economic Studies 23 (1955-56) : 165-180. 
It is not a tautology, however. Preference theory usually 
includes axioms such as transivity and the "weak axiom of 
revealed preference," and with these or other axioms there is the 
possibility of counter-evidence and refutability. For an example 
of counter-evidence see David Grether and Charles Plott, 
"Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference Reversal 
10. 
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1 2 .  
13. 
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Phenomenon," American Economic Review. Vol. 6 9 ,  No. 4, Sept . 
1979, 623-38 . 
For some further discussion, see Hillel Steiner, "the Rights of 
Future Generations , "  chap. 9 .  
Dasgupta and Heal discuss three of the four approaches in P . S .  
Dasgupta and G.M. Real, Economic Theory and Exhaustible Resources 
(Digswell Place, Welwyn: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 
chap . 9 .  
This is the condition defining a Poison process. See Dasgupta 
and Real, Economic Theory and Exhaustible Resources, pp. 260-5 , 
for further discussion; pp. 269-75, for discussion of B; pp. 275-
81, for D. 
This road combines arguments (3) ,  (4) , and (5) of Derek Parfit, 
"Energy Policy and the Further Futuie, Part I," chap . 2 .  
13a. This reinterpretation was made, independently, in Ferejobn and 
Page as in Dasgupta and Beal. 
14. The ambitious reader can consult Tjalling Koopmans , 
"Representation of Preference Orderings Over Time , "  in Decision 
and Organizations, edited by C.B. McGuire and R. Radner 
(Amsterdam: North Bolland Publishing Co . ,  1972).
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